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My CPS
Note Well
• The contents of this presentation cannot in 
anyway be construed as representing the 
views of the author or of his employer or 
of the Queen of England, and if anything, 
was encouraged by the conference 
organisers and the audience 
Remove liability 
from yourself
Transfer liability to subjects and relying parties
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Some PKI History
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X.509 – the Basics
• In 1988 the first version of X.509 was 
issued
• Very simple in concept
• A certificate binds a globally unique X.500 
distinguished name to a public key
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More Basics
• X.509 (88) only envisaged a user needing a single 
key pair at any one time. This could be used to 
sign/encrypt everything
– Pragmatics of losing a signing key and a decryption key 
soon led to a rethink on key pairs
– But some systems are still happy with single key pairs
• Globally Unique Names would be allocated by 
Naming Authorities starting from ISO 9594 which 
defines country codes based on ISO 3166 Codes for 
the representation of names of countries
• Each country then creates its own naming authority 
or authorities
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Why do we need Global Names/IDs ?
• To make sure that allocated names are globally unique. 
Local names by definition are not.
• Cant we simply use the key ID ?
• Yes, but names outlive keys (usually!), and key IDs are not 
exactly user friendly (have you ever tried using SPKI?). 
How do we link a key ID to its owner e.g. a real person?
• The purpose of a CA should be to authenticate an existing
name (not to allocate it or register it) and then bind it to the
current temporary public key. Then people who already 
know the name, automatically know whose key it is.
• Look what happens when we allow anyone to act as a CA 
and to allocate any names they choose
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PGP Key Search for d.w.chadwick
Only 2 are mine, 2 were created by my students trying to masquerade as me
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Cop Out
• Most CAs, probably because they were 
directed by their lawyers, chose not to use pre-
existing globally unique names for their 
subjects, but rather to allocate local names 
themselves, often based on their own name
• This is probably part of removing all liability 
from the CA, so that it cant be sued
• Interestingly, Verisign Class 1 certs do use 
globally unique names (email addresses) and 
do verify them during the registration process 
(but more about that later)
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Use of Global Names
• But doesn’t the use of global names lead to 
Identity theft?
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Identity Theft
• Protection of identity should NOT be based on having 
secret identities
– This is secrecy by obscurity, which is a BAD thing
– How can George Bush keep his identity secret?
• Identity protection should be based on having strong 
credentials that are very hard to steal e.g.
– Really secret secrets (and not my mother’s maiden name)
– Not biometrics (which are public) but rather the live capture 
of biometrics
– Hardware tokens rather than software tokens
• And if someone steals my credentials I should easily 
know about it
– Like loss or theft of my mobile phone or my credit card
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Global Naming in Practice
• This worked well in some cases e.g. the UK
– BSI created British Standard BS 7453 Part 1. Procedures for UK 
Registration for Open System Standards Part 1: Procedures for the 
UK Name Registration Authority
– Gave procedures for registering OIDs, X.500 DNs and X.400 O/R 
names
– Allowed all UK public and limited companies to use their existing 
registered company names and numbers to provide default X.500 
DNs and OIDs without needing to re-register or pay any additional 
fees
– OIDs are 1.2.826.0.n and DNs c=gb,o=registered name Ltd
– All UK universities registered their preferred X.500 DNs with BS 
7453 at a cost of £150 each
• IANA set up a global OID register for anyone via its web 
stie http://www.iana.org/cgi-bin/enterprise.pl
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It should have worked well in all 
cases
• Because every country already has several 
unique national naming and numbering schemes
– E.g. National insurance numbers, national company 
names, national ID cards, national health numbers, 
national driving licenses etc. etc.
• Because the Internet already has a global 
naming scheme (called the DNS)
• Because various international schemes also 
already exist 
– E.g. IATA, DUNS, BICC
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But there were Problems
• The US (as always ---
• Naming International 
Organisations 
– ISO refused to set up a naming 
register for them
– All ISO had to do was edit 
IS 6532 (Structure for the 
Identification of Organisations)
– But who would pay to run the 
service?
• Who would operate a global 
directory service in which to 
locate certificates and CRLs ?
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Examples of previous Standards 
problems with the US
• Overheard at one ISO meeting “Why don’t you guys use 
standard paper sizes like we do in the US”
– have they never heard of A4?
• Why don’t you guys use standard mobile phone 
frequencies like we do 
– have they never heard of GSM?
• Why cant everyone use ASCII standard characters to write 
their names like we in the US do 
– have they never heard of accents and different character sets like 
Greek, Cyrillic, Arabic, Chinese, Kanji??
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US Naming
• ANSI coerced all commercial organisations to 
register at the state level, creating names such as:
– C=US, St=Maryland, O=IBM,etc.
• By charging $2,500 for national registration
• But the various US states never bothered to create 
naming authorities, so organisations found it 
impossible to get globally unique distinguished 
names for a fair price
• Consequence. Everyone set up their directory names 
with a root local name of O=My Company Name
– This was even RECOMMENDED by Netscape
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Global Naming Easily Solved
• Global naming is not difficult, otherwise how would email 
work?
• One Solution. Leverage the DNS, and create X.500 DNs for 
certs using the DC attribute type defined in RFC 2247 plus 
CommonName for the last component
– E.g. fred@mx.com Æcn=fred,dc=mx,dc=com
– Incidentally, RFC 2247 was published in Jan 1998
• Or use person’s full name for CN, and where multiple 
entities exist with the same name use the Serial Number 
attribute to differentiate 
– E.g. CN=David Chadwick + Serial Number=1234, dc=salford, 
dc=ac, dc=uk
– X.520 was specifically edited to allow for this
• Alternatively, use existing social security numbers, health 
numbers etc. prefixed by an ISO 3166 country code
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This is how we have set up our 
Entrust PKI (now)
However PKI vendors could not support 
this naming scheme until 2000 onwards
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Spurious Arguments
• Arguments about how to name nomads, 
people in blocks of flats or in prisons, on ships 
etc. are spurious and irrelevant to PKI
• Are we saying we cannot email these people 
today? Or that they cannot obtain passports, 
social security numbers etc.
– Well perhaps yes for people in prison!
• But in general they already have globally 
unique names (possibly several)
• The important thing for the CA is to 
authenticate the name they already have, not 
to allocate it
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A Less Flexible Alternative
• Use the hash of the public key as a globally unique 
name. Use CN or define a new attribute type for this 
(say KID) and a rule for creating base64 strings from 
the hash
• Create DNs of the form 
– KID=34A52F9EB28C… or
– CN=<KID> 34A52F9EB28C…</KID>1
• This solves the certificate chain validation problem, but 
because it directly links the person’s ID to the key, it 
lacks flexibility in key rollover, and is difficult to 
identify who the key owner is
1Suggested by Frank Siebenlist
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PARADISE – a Global X.500 
Directory Service
• The EC COSINE funded PARADISE project ran a global 
X.500 directory service from 1990 to 94
• Funded by DANTE and others until November 1999
• Based on ESPRIT funded Quipu X.500 code developed 
by UCL between 1985-88
• In its heyday (94-96) Paradise had nearly 2 million 
entries from over a 1000 organisations connected 
together by over 600 DSAs
• Note that LDAP servers today still cannot provide an 
equivalent service, which is why US DoD and others still 
use X.500 servers to support PKIs
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But there were Problems in Paradise
• No one (outside the US) knew which US State directory to 
look in for organisation entries 
• Similarly, US folk typically didn’t know which countries 
European organisations were in. 
– Is Stella Artois from Belgium, the Netherlands or France? 
• So users did not know where to start their directory 
searches to find remote certificates and CRLs 
• The result was inefficient global searching of Paradise and 
poor performance
– Plus poor admin tools etc. etc. typical from university provided
software
• Eventually Paradise had to be switched off because Quipu 
was not Y2K compliant. Now been replaced by LDAP
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LDAP
• So far, LDAP has not done a great job of supporting PKI 
requirements                                       Stephen Kent, PKIX Chair
• Some things LDAP can’t do
• Can’t search for specific certificates or CRLs based on their 
contents
• Can’t retrieve a single CRL or cert from a multi-valued attribute
• Can’t always store using V2 userCertificate and retrieve using 
V3 userCertificate;binary
• In general companies don’t make their LDAP information 
publicly available so can’t look up certs or CRLs anyway
Full description in: D.W.Chadwick. “Deficiencies in LDAP when used to 
support a Public Key Infrastructure”, Communications of the ACM, 
March 2003/Vol 46, No. 3 pp. 99-104.
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 24
PKI use of LDAP DNs
• So far, PKI has not done a great job of supporting 
LDAP/X.500 distinguished names
David Chadwick, 1st EuroPKI W/shop
• PKI vendors and implementers don’t know the 
meaning of ASN.1 SEQUENCE and cannot 
differentiate between a SET and a SEQUENCE in an 
X.500 DN
– Distinguished naming is more or less random with arbitrary 
grouping of AVAs, and the ordering and number of RDNs
» Peter Gutmann, 2004 PKI 
Worshop
– “I don't treat a DN as a SET or SEQUENCE but as a 
"string". That is how e-business do it.” A Very Vocal 
Voice on the PKIX list (name wit held so as to not cause too much 
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CAs and DNs
• Some DNs may be encoded backwards which is 
a result of the unfortunate LDAP RFC 1779 string 
representation
• “One European national CA encodes DNs
backwards and forwards at random. Other CAs
are more consistent in getting DNs backwards”
Peter Gutmann, NIST PKI W/shop 
2004
• I don’t think any PKI software supports 
X.500/LDAP DN matching rules. They usually do 
a simple binary string compare.
• Microsoft doesn’t even allow multi-AVAs in RDNs 
in Active Directory and IE shows them as 
separate RDNs
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A multi-AVA RDN displayed in IE6
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Accessing Directories
• Most organisations don’t allow public 
access to their directories to obtain certs and 
CRLs
• Solution
– Use a web gateway
– Use an LDAP/X.500 firewall
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Web Access
• Free Http/LDAP gateways can be obtained from the 
Internet. E.g.
– Web500gw written by Frank.Richter@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de
– Download free from http://web500gw.sourceforge.net/
– Web2LDAP gateway written by Michael Ströder
michael@stroeder.com
– Free download from http://www.web2ldap.de/download.html
• Benefits
– Strictly limit the types of operations e.g. no modifications, adds or 
deletes
– Strictly limit the attributes that can be returned
– Strictly limit the DIT subtree that can be searched
– Opens up your firewall nicely
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LDAP/X.500 Firewalls
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Guardian DSA functionality
• Configurable incoming and outgoing filters to 
– Prevent access to sensitive information
– Prevent overwriting of important information
– Prevent accidental release of confidential information
– Prevent access to external information
– Check credentials and discard or replace untrustworthy ones
– Block all Modification operations
– Remove confidential attributes, names, referrals, cross references, 
signatures etc.
Full details in: Chadwick, D.W., Young, A.J. “Enabling The Internet 
White Pages Service - The Directory Guardian”, presented at The 
Internet Society 1998 Symposium on Network and Distributed 
Systems Security (NDSS 98), March 10-12, San Diego, California 
• Similar system was made into a commercial product by 
Nexor – the Directory Guardian
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The EC PASSWORD Project
• The EC PASSWORD project (1992-94) built X.509 clients and 
servers, but found
• It took 11 secs on a 386 to create a digital signature
• SMTP worked better than X.400 for transferring secure Email 
– This was because X.400 stored the security information on the message 
envelope, rather than inside it, therefore MTAs that did not understand this 
bounced the message, whereas SMTP servers relayed them OK
• Users could not only sign documents, but could also sign their own 
certificates and introduce their friends into the PKI
• This led to the basicConstraints extension being introduced into the 
1997 X.509 standard
– basicConstraints says whether a cert is an end user cert (default) or a CA cert,
and if a CA cert, also the max number of CA certs that may follow this one in 
the path
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PKI Hype
• During the late 90s every year was the year 
of PKI
• 1997 was the year of PKI
• So was 1998
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PKI Reality
• During the late 90s a national organisation set up a 
national PKI service in the UK and reported 
several hundred bugs to their PKI software vendor
– The PKI service went bust in 2002
• Different software releases were incompatible 
with earlier releases
– Meant that sometimes you had to re-issue all your certs
and start again
• User interfaces were difficult (an understatement!)
• Administrative interfaces and error diagnostic 
messages were gooble de gook or misleading
• Etc. etc. Its all history now.
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Commercial Consequences of the PKI Hype
• Many PKI companies started in the late 90s
• They flourished on the dotcom boom
• But there was something fundamentally wrong with the 
market
• Companies like Entrust and Baltimore had P/E ratios in 
their thousands or even infinity (if loss making)
• A company with a P/E ratio of 1000 on doubling its 
earnings every year would take 6 years to reduce it to 15
– That’s a long term huge financial risk to take
• In 1999 Entrust and RSA had the same share price whilst 
RSA had 10 times the earnings of Entrust
– Message. Sell you Entrust shares and buy RSA ones quick!
• Eventually this led to many PKI company failures
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 35
X.509 Standard’s Cock Ups
• Changing the semantics of X.509 elements and 
not changing their OIDs. Examples
• The first (88) and second (93) versions of CRLs 
were different but used the same attribute OID
– Got away with it because no-one had implemented 88 
CRLs
• The ’97 definition of skipCerts in the 
policyConstraints extension had its semantics 
changed in 2001, but the OID of the extension 
remains the same
– Caused confusion because some companies had 
implemented the 97 semantics and then had to change it
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Too Many Almost Duplicate or 
Conflicting Extensions
• CRL number (supposed to be unique) and CRL stream 
identifier (identifies context in which CRL number is 
unique)
• Freshest CRL and Distribution Point extensions in 
certificates both point to where the latest CRLs can be 
found
• CRL Scope and Issuing Distribution Point both describe 
the contents of a CRL 
• “Because of the potential for conflicting information a 
CRL shall not contain both the deltaCRLIndicator
extension and a crlScope extension with the 
baseRevocationInfo component” X.509 (2001)
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The Non-Repudiation Bit
• Never in the field of human intellect has so much 
time and effort been spent by so many on so little
David “Winston” Chadwick
• This one bit has caused more hot air, more defect 
resolution time, more paper descriptions, counter 
descriptions, re-wording and re-re-rewording than 
any other part of X.509
• So what’s all the fuss about?
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Repudiation
• Repudiation is a legal issue. It is up to a judge to 
determine if a signatory intended to digitally sign a 
document or not. The setting of the “non-repudiation”
bit cannot prove the legal validity of a digital 
signature
• Anyone is entitled to repudiate an action at a later 
date. A judge determines their intentions
• So even if I digitally sign a message using my smart 
card, PIN and biometric and the NR bit is set in the 
corresponding certificate, I can still repudiate my 
action later on
After all – SOMEONE MIGHT 
HAVE HAD A GUN TO MY HEAD
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PKI Today
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 40
Content Commitment (March 04 text)
• So the bit is now named Content Commitment
– “Any participant in an event may subsequently decide to repudiate
anything that participant digitally signed in that event. For example, 
one can dispute one’s participation in a key establishment or being 
the originator of a signed email message as easily as one can 
dispute one’s signing a document with the intent to be bound to the 
content of that document.”
– “contentCommitment: for verifying digital signatures which 
are intended to signal that the signer is committing to the content 
being signed. The type of commitment the certificate can be used
to support may be further constrained by the CA, e.g. through a 
certificate policy. The precise type of commitment of the signer e.g. 
"reviewed and approved" or "with the intent to be bound", may be
signalled by the content being signed, e.g. the signed document 
itself or some additional signed information.”
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And More…
– “Setting a specific value of KeyUsage in a certificate 
does not in itself signal for an instance of 
communication that the communicating parties are 
acting in accordance with this setting, e.g. when signing 
a document. Definition of methods by which parties may 
signal their intent for a specific instance of communication 
(e.g. commitment to content for that specific instance) is 
outside the scope of this Directory Specification, but it is 
anticipated that multiple methods will exist. Although not 
recommended, it is possible to use the content of the 
certificate, e.g. certificate policy, to signal the intent of the 
signing. However, since that signal was made when the 
certificate was issued by the CA, such use may not meet the 
requirement that declaring the intent is made at the time of 
signing by the signer.”
• So is there any value left in the key usage extension ??
• Apparently not, since the user can over-ride this in IE6
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Over-riding Key Usage
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Current uses of PKI today
• Who is using PKI today? Many and varied
• All SSL servers use a PKI (of sorts)
• All web browsers support PKI (of sorts)
• In several countries e.g. Spain and UK, you can fill in tax returns to 
the Inland Revenue using PKI certs
• In US, the DOD is enforcing a requirement that all contractors 
participate in the Interim External CA program. 
– IECA requires DOD contractors (approx 350,000 of them) to have one-year 
encrypted digital certificates to ensure the security of vendor communications 
with the department e.g. when submitting electronic invoices 
– Published March 04 at http://www.gcn.com/23_6/news/25310-1.html
• Many commercial banks are using PKI for Internet banking
• Scientific Grid community requires use of PKI
• Several countries have incorporated PKI key pairs into their national 
ID cards e.g. Finland, Sweden, Italy, Belgium
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 44
POS
DB2






• Safeway shares real time information with Walls about 
stock levels, shelf space and sales forecasts
• Walls uses this to decide when to deliver
• Lead times reduced from 45 hours to 10 hours, service 
levels increased from 90% to 95%
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Bank use of PKI – Some examples
• Scotiabank, Canada was the first to use PKI, using 
Entrust. Launched in 1997
• Identrus, the organisation originally formed in 1988 by 
9 banks, now has > 60 financial institutions as 
participants
• And not forgetting its rival Betrusted, formed by PWC 
in 1999, and now owned by BankOne of America
• The Danish Savings Banks Data Center uses mobile 
phones and a central key store to provide user roaming
– Over 50 Danish banks participate in this
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3. Letter sent to customer’s 
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Scotiabank, Canada
• Users must already be registered account holders 
with bank
• Every user is given a unique ID and DN of the form 
{O=Scotiabank, UID=123456789}
– Note the local naming, but certificate was only intended 
to be used in this domain
• User’s X.500 DIT entry held X.509 public key 
certificate, account information and attribute 
certificates which authorised particular banking 
services
• In 2004 converted to Betrusted certificates
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Grid use of PKI
• Grid users authenticate with dig sigs and X.509 
certificates
• They want to spawn jobs to run on various computers 
throughout the Grid
• The idea is to have the job create its own key pair, then 
the user signs the job’s certificate so that the job can be a 
proxy for the user
• But certificate validation did not work because of the 
basicConstraints extension which stops users issuing certs
– Remember the experiences of the PASSWORD project??
• The result – a new proxy extension added to over-ride
basicConstraints, effectively allowing the user to act as a CA!
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UK Grid Registration Procedures
• Registration requires face to face authentication to provide 
medium assurance certificates
• This means the user physically comes to the RA with a 
photo ID card (usually their university ID card)
• But this is an expensive and time consuming process
• We have suggested that universities could use their student 
registration database to do bulk registration for medium 
assurance certificates
• This has been rejected on the basis that a photo ID is 
currently required for face to face authentication
• But the photo ID card that is usually used is the one  
generated from the student registration database!!!
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National ID cards and PKIs
• Italy was one of  the first countries, in 2001
• It uses the name and social security number 
to identify the owner
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But - Some have Really Lost the Plot
• EC with its qualified certificates and piles of standards 
(equivalent of gold pen to sign a letter)
• Web browsers by adding 100+ trusted root CAs to our 
browsers
• PKIX (and X.509) with its myriad of certificate 
extensions and standards
• CA providers with their subject distinguished names e.g.
– E = d.w.chadwick@salford.ac.uk, CN = David Chadwick, 
OU = Digital ID Class 1 - Microsoft Full Service, OU = 
Persona Not Validated, OU = 
www.verisign.com/repository/RPA Incorp. by 
Ref.,LIAB.LTD(c)98, OU = VeriSign Trust Network, O = 
VeriSign, Inc.
– CN = Microsoft Internet Authority
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EESSI Standards
• CWA 14167-1 (2001): "Security Requirements for Trustworthy 
Systems Managing Certificates for Electronic Signatures - Part 1: 
System Security Requirements".
• CWA 14167-2 (2002): "Security Requirements for Trustworthy 
Systems Managing Certificates for Electronic Signatures - Part 2 
Cryptographic Module for CSP Signing Operations – Protection 
Profile (MCSO-PP)".
• CWA 14169 (2002): "Secure Signature-Creation Devices, version 
'EAL 4+'".
• CWA 14170 (2001): "Security Requirements for Signature Creation 
Systems".
• CWA 14171 (2001): "Procedures for Electronic Signature 
Verification".
• CWA 14172-1 (2001): "EESSI Conformity Assessment Guidance -
Part:1: General".
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EESSI Standards (cont)
• CWA 14172-2 (2001): "EESSI Conformity Assessment Guidance -
Part 2: Certification Authority services and processes".
• CWA 14172-3 (2001): "EESSI Conformity Assessment Guidance -
Part 3: Trustworthy systems managing certificates for electronic
signatures".
• CWA 14172-4 (2001): "EESSI Conformity Assessment Guidance -
Part 4: Signature Creation Applications and Procedures for Electronic 
Signature Verification".
• CWA 14172-5 (2001): "EESSI Conformity Assessment Guidance -
Part 5: Secure signature creation devices".
• CWA 14355 (2002): "Guidelines for the implementation of Secure 
Signature-Creation Devices".
• ETSI SR 002 176: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); 
Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures".
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EESSI Standards (cont)
• ETSI TS 101 456: "Policy requirements for certification authorities 
issuing qualified certificates".
• ETSI TS 101 733: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); 
Electronic Signature Formats".
• ETSI TS 101 862: "Qualified certificate profile".
• ETSI TS 101 903: "XML Advanced Electronic Signatures 
(XAdES)".
• ETSI TR 102 038: "TC Security - Electronic Signatures and 
Infrastructures (ESI); XML format for signature policies".
• ETSI TR 102 041: "Signature Policies Report".
• ETSI TR 102 045: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); 
Signature policy for extended business model".
• AND this is not a complete list
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PKIX IDs and RFCs
• Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public 
Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile," RFC 3280, April
2002    
• Adams, C., Farrell, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Certificate Management Protocols," 
• Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D., and Kemp D. "Internet X.509 Public 
Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),“
• Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and Wu, S., "Internet 
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification 
Practices Framework,"   
• Myers, M., Liu, X., Fox, B., and Weinstein, J., "Certificate 
Management Messages over CMS,“
• Farrell, S., and Housley, R., "An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile 
for Authorization," RFC 3281, April 2002. 
• Yee, P., "Attribute Certificate Request Message Format," 
• Yee, P., "Attribute Certificate Management Messages over CMS," 
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PKIX IDs and RFCs (cont)    
• Chadwick, D., Legg, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Additional LDAP Schema for PKIs and PMIs,"
• Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and Weinstein, J., "Certificate 
Management Messages over CMS," (RFC 2797), April 2000. 
• Adams, C., Farrell, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key  Infrastructure 
Certificate Management Protocols," RFC 2510, March 1999. 
• R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax," RFC 2630, July 1999.  
• Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D., and Kemp, D., "Internet X.509 
Certificate Request Message Format," RFC 2511, March 1999. 
• Prafullchandra, H., and Schaad, J., "Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-
Possession Algorithms," RFC 2875, July 2000 1999. 
• Myers, M., Adams, C., Farrell, S., "Delegated Path Discovery with 
OCSP". 
• Myers, M., Adams, C., Farrell, S., "Delegated Path Validation". 
• Pinaks, D., Housley, R., "Delegated Path Validation and Delegated 
Path Discovery Protocol Requirements (DPV&DPD-REQ)," 
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 58
PKIX IDs and RFCs (cont)
• Adams, C., Sylvester, P., Zolotarev, M., Zuccherato, R., "Internet 
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Certification Server Protocols", 
RFC 3029, February 2001. 
• Housley, R., and Hoffman, P., "Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP," RFC 2585, 
July 1998. 
• Lynn, C., Kent, S., Seo, K., "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and 
AS Identifiers," 
• Housley, R., and Polk, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet 
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates," RFC 2528, March 
1999. 
• Farrell, S., Chadwick, C.W., "Limited Attribute Certificate   
Acquisition Protocol". 
• Santesson, S. Housley, R., Freeman, T., "X.509 Internet Public Key 
Infrastructure Logotypes in X.509 Certificates," 
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PKIX IDs and RFCs (cont) 
• Myers, M., Ankney, R., Adams, C., "Online Certificate Status   
Protocol, version 2," 
• Pinka, D., Gindin, T., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Permanent Identifier,"
• Boeyen, S., Howes, T., and Richard, P., "Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Operational Protocols - LDAPv2," RFC 2559,  April 
1999. 
• Chadwick, D.W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Operational Protocols - LDAPv3,“
• Chokhani, S., and Ford, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework," RFC 2527, 
March 1999. 
• Santesson, S., Polk, W., Barzin, P., and Nystrom, M., "Internet   
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates," RFC 3039,  
January 2001. 
• Boeyen, S., Hallam-Baker, P., "Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Repository Locator Service,“
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PKIX IDs and RFCs (cont)
• Bassham, L., Housley, R., Polk, W., "Algorithms and Identifiers for 
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
Profile,“
• Boeyen, S., Howes, T., and Richard, P., "Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema," RFC 2587, June 1999. 
• Malpani, A., Hoffman, P., Housley, R., and Freeman, T.,  "Simple 
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP),"
• Schaad, J., " CMC Extensions: Server Side Key Generation and Key 
Archival," 
• Singer, A., and Whyte, W., "Supplemental Algorithms and Identifiers 
for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL 
Profile,"
• Gindin, T., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Technical 
Requirements for a non-Repudiation Service," December 2000. 
• Schaad, J. Myers, M., Liu, X., Weinstein, J., "CMC Transport," 
• Kapoor , A., Tschalaer, R., "Transport Protocols for CMP," 
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PKIX IDs and RFCs (cont)
• Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and 
Adams, C., "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure 
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP," RFC 2560, June 
1999. 
• Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and Zuccherato, R., 
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp 
Protocols", RFC 3161, August 2001 
– I trust Company X enough to do $20million of business with them,
but I do not trust them enough to be able to tell the time
• Linsenbardt, D., Pontius, S., "Warranty Certificate 
Extension,“
• And I have missed some of the latest ones ☺
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Whatever happened to KISS ?
• Keep It Simple Stupid
– As Ravi Sandhu says “security that is too complex wont 
be implemented or will be implemented wrongly”
– X.509 and its myriad of extensions is now far too 
complex for most people to understand and implement 
correctly
– Even national reps to X.509 meetings are no longer 
familiar with all the contents of the standard
• The result
– Most extensions have not been implemented or 
implemented properly
• Whatever happened to KISS?
Kiss My Ass ?
© 2004 David Chadwick First EuroPKI Workshop 25 June 2004 63
One thing X.509 did get right
• Compact binary encodings using ASN.1
• The alternative XML encodings are verbose, have poor 
performance, and often cant be read by humans anyway
• Research by UoS shows that using ASN.1 BER for signed 
certificate type constructs performs an order of a magnitude 
better than using XML signatures
– Mundy, D. and Chadwick, D.W., "An XML Alternative for 
Performance and Security: ASN.1", IEEE IT Professional, 
Vol 6., No.1, Jan 2004, pp30-36
• Sun have also published a paper with similar findings
– P. Sandoz, S. Pericas-Geertsen, K. Kawaguchi, M. Hadley, and E.
Pelegri-Llopart. “Fast Web Services”, Aug 2003, Available from: 
http://java.sun.com/developer/technicalArticles/WebServices/fast
WS/
• W3C now has the XML Binary Characterization Working 
Group
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ASN.1 Success Stories
• Without ASN.1-defined messages:
– The lights go out!
– Mobile phones don’t work!
– Parcels get lost!
– Traffic lights fail!
– Aircraft fall from the sky!
– Your impending marriage suffers
as Net Meeting fails!
X XXX X
X
Thanks to Prof John Larmouth for the above list
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Who says binary encodings cant work?
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Conclusion
• It’s the wide availability of tools that matter, 
not the encoding format
• If a comprehensive set of Open Source ASN.1 
tools had been made available 15 years ago it 
would have been the encoding format of 
choice today
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Who says XML is readable?
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One thing SPKI got right
• Attaching local names to public keys/certificates
• Netscape did not quite get it right, as the next screen 
shows
One thing SPKI got wrong
• Passing the local name around to other users
• The local name should stay local and a global 
name/ID should accompany the public key
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WHO THE HECK DESIGNED THIS??
Which planet were they from??
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So What is the Point of a digital 
signature and a PKI Anyway?
It cant be to authenticate who sent the Email can it?
Look what happens when we click on Signed
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And even if you click on View/Edit …
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You have to look real hard to see it was a 
Persona Not Validated certificate–
Why make it so obtuse??
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What Should Verisign Have Done?
• NOT allowed the user to insert any name in the 
Common Name field
• Verisign do validate the globally unique email address, 
so… EITHER
• Put the validated Email address in the Common Name 
field (using DC naming as well if desired) OR
• Put “Anonymous User” or “Name Not Validated” or 
something similar in the Common Name field and put 
the Email address in the Subject Alt Name extension
• But THEY SHOULD NOT have allowed the user to 
put anything they wanted in the Common Name field
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Returning to the LDAP problems
• Can’t search for specific certificates or CRLs based on their 
contents
• Can’t retrieve a single CRL or cert from a multi-valued 
attribute 
– Solution XPS – the X.509 attribute Parsing Server 
– Sits in front of (or part of) the LDAP server. Parses X.509 
attributes (CRLs, PKCs and ACs) and creates a separate entry for 
each one, with each field a separate attribute
– Implements current PKIX Internet Drafts
• Can’t find the right LDAP server to Search – many 
solutions but few implemented ! E.g.
– For DC based DNs, perform a DNS look up of well known alias 
i.e. ldap.domain.name or use DNS SRV records, which bind host 
name/port to service
– Use IAI PKIX extension
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The XPS DIT Structure
• PKCs and ACs are held in child entries
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LDAP Client view of XPS
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Finding the right LDAP server
• Use the AIA extension defined by PKIX
– But need to have one cert to find next in chain
– Note that AIA works for http, ftp as well as ldap
• If using DC based naming, convert user’s DN into a 
domain name
– start at RHS and stop at first non-DC RDN e.g. cn=david 
chadwick, ou=sales, dc=jtm, dc=com    becomes jtm.com
– Then lookup WKS RR or SRV RR in DNS
– But need to know DN of certificate subject
• If not using DC based naming much harder
– Pre-configure LDAP clients (Entrust solution) with details of 
LDAP server
– Have an LDAP knowledge server that returns referrals
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Example Use of SRV Records
• E.g. I want the certificate for cn=person1, ou=dept1, 
dc=myorg, dc=com














IN SRV 86400  0  0 389 sysx.myorg.com
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Finding the right Certificate/CRL
• Because of all the problems with LDAP, Peter Gutmann 
suggests using the Web as the public repository as follows:
• Simple solution
– Stick a base64-encoded certificate on your home page
– Add a standardised string for search engines, e.g. certificate 
joe@foo.com
– Search Google, cut & paste
• Proper solution
– Use HTTP to fetch keys from a backend database
– GET uri?attrib=value e.g. GET /search-
cgi?email=joe@foo.com
– Define a whole set of attributes
– This would work nicely with an XPS backend!!
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Confusion between Authentication 
and Authorisation
• PKI was always intended as an authentication infrastructure
• But people try to use it as an authorisation infrastructure, 
which is shown in such statements as
• “the "all-or-nothing" trust policy implicit in PKI for SSL 
and browsers is less than helpful”
• “It doesn't make sense for applications to rely on the 100-
odd certs of often-dubious provenance trusted by most 
browsers.  Instead there should be application-specific roots 
matched to the policies and needs of the application”
• But if a user’s signed request was only used to authenticate 
the user/signing key and in addition the user had to have an 
authorisation certificate to gain access (which could be tied 
to their public key or name) then the root cert problem 
disappears.
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PKI Future
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Some things to Aim for
• Single Sign On
– We might be getting there with Shibboleth and 
Liberty Alliance
• Separate authentication and authorisation into 
two infrastructures – PKI and PMI (Privilege 
Management Infrastructure) e.g. as in X.509 
2001, and remove authorisation from the user
• Automate the handling of Trust in the PKI to a 
Trust Management Infrastructure
• Make PKI user friendly and ubiquitous
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Separate Authn & Authz Infrastructures
• Authentication and Authorisation are External to the Application
• Authorisation is external to the user
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Have a Trust Management 
Infrastructure
• Have a trust management infrastructure that can 
compute trustworthiness of entities - PKI roots and 
end users
• Reputation systems for end user trust are already in 
existence e.g. e Bay
• Research system has already been produced for 
calculating the trustworthiness of PKI roots – e.g. 
the Intelligent Computation of Trust project at UoS
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Link Authorisation Infrastructure to 
Trust Management Infrastructure
• Tie the authorisation decision making process into the 
trustworthiness of the user and the PKI root E.g. 
– User can read resource X if Authentication Level > 1 and 
CA’s trust quotient > 0.3 and user’s reputation > 0.6
– User can write to resource X if Authentication Level > 2 
and CA’s trust quotient > 0.5 and user’s reputation > 0.9
• NIST already have a Draft Recommendation for 
Electronic Authentication 
– Special Publication 800-63, Jan 2004, defines 4 levels of 
authentication
• We now have a couple of project to implement this 
into our PERMIS authorisation infrastructure
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The PKI Server
• Developed by Fraunhoffer Institute in Germany
• PKI server is responsible for
– Management of root certs and CRLs
– Management of security policies
– Trust path construction and validation
– Talking various protocols e.g. OCSP, LDAP, SCVP
• PKI Server is driven by validation and signature policies
– Persistent ones defined by the management
– Temporary ones defined by clients
• PKI client can simply ask for
– Signature and/or certificate validation
– Trust path construction and/or validation
• PKI client simply has to trust the certificate of the PKI server and 
hence the signed responses
– Revocation of PKI server certificate is not defined
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Use of Hardware Tokens
• Keyboard sniffers are a problem when you have a 
software encrypted private key
– Capture the encrypted private key file and the password
• Hardware token to hold key pair can solve this
• Smart cards – possibly
• National ID cards – more likely
• Mobile Phones – certain to be the winner
– Provide mobility
– Ubiquitous, 800 Million users with up to 80% coverage 
in some countries
– One third are lost or stolen each year, nearly one half are 
replaced each year, so capability is being rolled out today
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Features of M-COMM Standard
• Can be used for face to face and citizen not present 
transactions
• Signature is provided by SIM or UICC smartcards
• User is shown what they are signing and confirms it 
by entering a Signing PIN
• Can be used to support EC qualified signatures
• Provided as a web service to application providers
• Defined in ETSI TR/TS 102 203/4/6/7
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So What is the Future of PKI?
The Future is Bright
The Future is PMI !
The Future is Trust Management !
The Future is Mobile Phone use of PKI !
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Thankyou !
• Any questions 
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